Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil
Rights Act) vas enacted to eliminate discriminatory
employment practices on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.' In 1978, Congress
elaborated on Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA), requiring that employers
treat pregnant employees the same as employees who
were not pregnant. In AI&Tv. fu/teen, the Supreme
Court ruled on whether it is permissible to penalize
retiring women by low ering their retirement pension
benefits for taking pregnancy-related disability leave
before the enactment of the PDA.3
Consider this scenario: In 1976, Company I had a
policy that distinuiished disability leave based on
vwhether it was pregnancy-related. Employees who
took pregnancy-related disability leave only received
pension benefits credit for thirty days of leave.
Employees taking non-pregnancy-related disability
leave received unlimited credit for their pension
benefits. 4 After the enactment of the PDA, Company
H allowed the same credit for both pregnancy and nonpregnancy-related disability leave. However, it refused
to adjust its credit system for the employees who took
pregnancy-related disability leave before the PDA.
Lilly, an employee of Company 11, took pregnancyrelated disability leave in 1976, before the Act, and
received smaller pension benefits than her colleagues
who took non-pregnancy-related disability leave.6
Under the holding of AT&T Hfulteen, Lilly is not
entitled to recover this discrepancy because Company
H's pension benefits calculation is facially neutral. The
PDA would have to be retroactive to find this action
discriminatory

Historically, discrimination against woinen concerning
childbirth and pregnancy was legally sanctioned
and resulted in fewer advantages for women in the
workforce. Pregnancy was treated less favorably than
other physical conditions that affected an employee's
performance in the workplace.) Most employers
discharged a woman as soon as she became noticeably
pregnant, and if she returned, she was considered a
new, rather than a returning employee. 10
Before 1978, many employers would give female
employees a naximum of thirty days of credited
pregnancy-related disability leave, while non-pregnant
employees would receive unlimited credit for disability
leave." Laws such as Title VII and the PDA were
enacted to protect pregnant women from this practice.
These laws forced many employers to change their
policies to allow unlimited credit for pregnancyrelated disability leave.13 However, PDA women who
took pregnancy-related disability leave prior to the
Act, were unable to receive full credit for leave lasting
longer than thirty days. 14 Consequently, these women
not only received smaller pension benefits, but also
were ineligible for new early retirement prograis. 1
In AT& T v. Hulteen, the Supreme Court considered
whether limiting the pregnancy-related benefits credit
where leave was taken before the PDA, was a Title VII
violation of the PDA.16 The Court held that employer
AT& I did riot violate Iitle VII when it limited pension
benefits based on this criteria.7 Ihe Court ruled that
AT& I's actions were facially neutral and qualified for
the bona fide seniority system exception.'1 To create a
Title VII violation, the Court concluded that the PDA
would have to apply retroactively.1
This Note argues that the reasoning in Ho/teen was

flawed because AT&T's pension benefits calculation
was intentionally discriminatory. Furthermore, the
PDA does nothave to be retroactive for.AT&T's pension
benefits calculation to be a Title VII violation. 20 Part
11examines the congressional intent behind the PDA,
the tests for determining a discriminatory action under
Title VII, and the background of flu/teen.21 Part III
argues that AT&T's pension benefits calculation was
intentionally discriminatory and a current Title VII

violation. The Court should have given the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's position
deference.22 Part IV proposes that, in response to
Hulteen, Congress should amend the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act to decrease the employee's burden of
proof in fringe benefit discrimination claims. 23 Part
V concludes that Hulteen penalizes xwomen that
are protected by IaN for taking pregnancy-related
disability leave and the IaN must be changed to provide
relief to these women. 24
IJ Bakroundl

A. The CivlRightsActs ProtectionofPregnant Ibmen
in the Iibrkplace and the Supreme Court's Defterence to
the Equal Enploiyment Opportunity Coinmission
The Civil Rights Act requires employers to provide
equal opportunities to all employees. ' Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act prohibits discriminatory employment
practices on the basis of race, color, religion sex or
national origin.'6 To meet this end, Title VII created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and delegated to it the primary responsibility
of preventing and eliminating unlawful employment
practices.' Employment discrimination based on
pregnancy continued after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act. In 1973, the EEOC respondedby developing
guidelines that prohibited employment policies that
discriminated against pregnant employees.28
The Supreme Court has given deference to the EEOC
interpretation guidelines. The Court gives deference to
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute, if
the agency has the authority to promulgate rules on that
statute. ' Congress gave the EEOC the power to issue
regulations on Title VII and provided in Section 713(b)
of Title VII that a reliance on the EEOC interpretations
svould absolve an employer from liability.' 0 The Court
gave the EEOC guidelines "great deference" in Phillips
vi VMartin Marietta Corp. because the EEOC was
charged with administering Title VII.3I The Supreme
Court also gave the EEOC guidelines "great deference"
in Griggs v.Duke Power Coa, because the Civ il Rights
Act itself and the legislativ e history supported the
EEOC interpretation.3 Th Court has giv en the EEOC
interpretations great deference, because the EEOC has
been giv en authority by Congress to administer the
principles of litle NVII.3
B. the Developmient of the PDA
Congress enacted the PDAV in response to General
E'lectric Comnpany v. (Gi/bert,vshere the Court held that
the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a
company's comprehensive disability program did not
constitute sexdiscriminationunderTitleVII.3Congress

elaborated on the purpose of ITitle VII by enacting
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that prohibited
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or any
related medical conditions.3 5Congress disagreed with
the /ilbert
decision and concluded that the company's
employment practice was sex discrimination because
men in the comprehensive disability program did not
get the same treatment as women for involuntary or
voluntary medical procedures.36
The PDA requires that pregnant employees receive
equal treatment as other employees with respect to their
benefits, and their ability to work.' The plain language
of the PDA defines discrimination "because of sex" or
lonthe basis of sex" to include discrimination based
on pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related medical
condition. 8 The statute also directly covers the receipt
of benefits under a fringe benefit progran.39
At the time Congress enacted the PDA, over eighty
million women were working to support their children.
The employment practice upheld in Gilbert would
have had a devastating effect on families.40 Therefore.
Congress enacted the PDA to repudiate the Gilbert
decision, and prohibit employment decisions on the
basis of pregnancy.41
C. The Bona Fide Seniority Systen Exception Under

Title I Section 7 03(h)
Congress exempted bona fide seniority systems from
Title VII and the PDA if the discriminatory effect
is facially neutral.42 A bona fide seniority system
determines an employee's compensation, conditions
or privileges of employment by the quantity or quality
of production without intentionally discriminating
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.43
Under Section 703(h) of Title VII, a seniority system is
facially neutral if it unintentionally affects a protected
group. 44 Employers seeking exemption must also show
that their policies are implemented in good faith.45
The Court has interpreted Section 703(1h) to protect

employers that have unintentionally extended the
effect of past discrimination. 46 In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, Black and
Hispanic employees brought a cause of action against
their employ er. Serv iceinen and city drivers, isho wvere
predominately Black aiid Hispanic, wvere paid less
than lie drisvers, who were predominately White.4
The city drivets or serv icemen vvho transterred to line
driver jobs started at the bottom ot all line dtisvems,
lotrteited all of their competitive senioity.4 8 The C'ourt
ruled that this seniority sy stcm xwas bona fide and
exempt from Title VII tinder Section 703(h) because
the system applied equally to all races.49 Most of the
city drivers and servicemen who were discouraged

from transferring to line driver jobs were White.50 Therefore, the seniority

system was not a violation of Jitle VII, because there was no discriminatory
intent.
D. When a Violation Occurs Under Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, states that a Title VII violation occurs when a
discriminatory seniority system actually deprives an employee of benefits.52
In addition, President Obama sinned recently signed the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act that states that an employer violates Title VIlif its employee
receives benefits that are based on discriminatory intent. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991, states that a Title VII violation occurs when a discriminatory
seniority system actually deprives an employee of benefits.54 The Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was a response to the Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber (C. Inc55 decision that ruled that an unlawful employment practice
occurs each time an individual is paid or receives benefits that are subject to
a discriminatory compensation decision.5 ITherefore, an employer violates
Title VII when their employee receives benefits that are affected by a
discriminatory decision.
E. Title VIDisparatef-InpactClais
The Supreme Court uses three tests to determine the legality of employment
practices under Title VII.
1. The Similar/y Situated Rule: Any Benefit that Delivers Less to a
SinilarlvSituated / niployee Is a iolation ofTitle VII
The Court developed the similarly situated rule in Bazemore . Friday.
According to this rule, a Title VII violation occurs every time an employee's
compensation is atlected by discrimination, regardless of whether the
pattern began prior to the effective date of Title VII. A Title VII violation
occurs when similarly situated employees receive different pay. Liability
may be imposed to the extent that the discrimination was perpetuated after
the enactment of Title VI.160
The Ninth Circuit applied the Bazemore rule in Pallas v. Pacific Bell,
holding that Pacific Bells pension benefits calculation violated Iitle V.II.1
In 1987, the aggrieved party was deemed ineligible for her company's
early retirement program, because she took pregnancy leave in 1972.62
The retirement program was facially discriminatory because it denied early
retirement to women on the sole basis that they took pregnancy-related
leave prior to the PDA5.63 The EEOC uses the fact pattern from Pallas as an
example of an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.64
2. The Present Violation Ru/e: A Seniority System Is FaciallyNveutra/ When
It (GivesIPresent ffeet to Past Discrimination
The Supreme Court also evaluates Title VII disparate-imnpact claims using
the preseint violatioii rule derived from Uniited/Airines v Evans>6 This
rule eiisures that emnployers are not found liable uder Title VII for facially
neutral actions that aie irerely present effects of past discrimination>6 In
Evans, the Court held that the discriiminatory effects of United Airlines'
seiiioiity sy stein vvere solely the restilt of past discrimination, therefore
no piesent v iolation existed. ' The complaining party, worked as a flight
attendant for United Airlines, which bad a policy that flight attendants had
to be unmarried tmales.68The airline forced her to resign in 1968 after she
got married, then rehired her in 1972 without giving her any credit for her
prior service.69

The Courtruled that UnitedAirlines' policy was non-discrimiinatory for two
reasons. First, the claim was based on present effects of past discrimination,
because the clanim was brought in 1977, based on discrimination that
occurred in 1968 and was corrected in 1972. Second, the policy applied
to employees equally.70 For these reasons, no Title VII violation had
occurred.1
3. the Ledbetter Rule: itle VI Disparate-tnpact Cl/aims Miist Show
Unlavful EInployment Practiceand DiscriminatoryIntent.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc. the Court introduced
another rule to use when evaluating Title VII disparate impact claims.
The Ledbeter Rule requires that a disparate-impact claim consist of an
unlawful employment practice and discriminatory intent.72 In Ledbettcer,
the aggrieved party clainied that employer evaluated her poorly because
of her gender, which resulted in lower pay then her male colleagues. The
Supreme Court reasoned that a fresh violation takes place when an unlawful
employment practice is committed with intentions to discriminate. # A Title
VII disparate-impact claim must include an unlawful employment practice
and intentional discrimination.7
E AT& Tv Ha/teen
The Hulteen Court evaluated whether AT&T's pension benefits calculation
policy violated Title VII.76 The policy denied fill pension benefits to
employees who took pregnancy-related disability leave prior to the PDA.
However, the policy gave full pension benefits to employees that took
other temporary non-pregnancy-related disability leave.77 The Court held
that AT&
1's pension benefits calculation was a boia fide seniority system
that vsas facially neutral and exempt from liability under Section 703(h).
The PDA would have to be retroactive to find Al&TI 's pension benefits
calculation discriminatory.' 9
1.Facts
The AT&T pension plan was inherited from its predecessor Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph's (PT&T).o The PT&T pension plan was based
on a net credit system, vshich calculated benefits based on an employee's
period of service at the company minus his or her unaccredited leave.
Employees who took pregnancy leave received the mnaxmnium service credit
for six weeks of leave, while those on disability leave earned full service
credit for their entire periods of absence.82 PT&T adopted an Anticipated
Disability Plan (ADP) that granted service credit for pregnancy-related
disability leave on the same basis as leave taken for other temporary
disabilities>" When PT1&I transferred its ow nership to AlT& T, AlT& I
retained its predecessor's policy and made no adjustments to the NDP ton
the credit lost by employees that took pragnaincy-ielated disability leave
prior toi the PDA.84
ITle aggriev ed parties in this case took pregnancy-related disability leav e
before the PDAN and did not receisve credit foi the leave taken over thirty
days.> The parties filed a complaint vsitli the BLOC betvween 1994 amid
2002, and the EEOC issued a Letlter ot Determination finding reasonable
cause to beliesve that AT& T disciminated against the respondents 86
2. En Bane Reviewv
On en banc review, the Ninth Circuit held that based on the similarly
situated rule in Bazeniore and Pallas,AT&T's pension benefits calculation

violated Title VII because it distinguished between
similarly situated employees based on pregnancy.
AlT& Iviolated Title VII because it excluded from
the pension benefits calculation pregnancy-related
disability leave lasting more than thirty days and taken
prior to the PDA. H'lolding that AT&T's policy was
discriminatory was aligned with the Congressional
intent behind the PDA.89
The court reasoned that the present violation rule
in Evans did not apply because AT&T's pension
benefits calculation was neither a past violation with
present effect nor facially neutral.90 In fact, the Ninth
Circuit held that the respondents' claim was a present
violation of the PDA. 91 Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the complaining parties were harmed when their
pregnancy-related disability leave taken prior to the
PDA was excluded forn the pension benefits policy.92
AT&T's pension benefits calculation was intentionally
discriminatory and a presenit Title VII violation.93
3. The Supreine Court' Decision

On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court overturned the
Ninth Circuit's decision by ruling that AT&T's pension
benefits calculation was facially neutral and not a
violation of Title VII94 The Court held that the pension
benefits in question were the current effects of AT&T's
net credit systemx,
which was considered lawful prior
to the enactment of the PDA. The similarly situated
rule in Baeinore did not apply to this case. 96 The
Court distinguished Bazemnore because Bazemore did
not involve a seniority system and that discriminatory
action occurred prior to enactment of the .97
The Supreme Court concluded that AT&T had a
bona tide seniority system that is protected under
Section 703(h), because it was not internationally
discriminatory.98 The only way to conclude that
Section 703(h) does not protect AT&T's seniority
system is to apply the PDA retroactively, which was
not a clear Congressional intent.99
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsberg agreed with
the Ninthi Circuit's decision that AT& T's pension
benefits calculation was intentionally discriminatory
because it distiinguislied between the respondents
and otlhei similarly situated enmployees based on
pregnancyi 9oo Justice Ciinsberg reasoned that xviile the
PDA does iiot require redress for past discrimination,
it xwas enacted to end sex-based disciimination from
and after 1978.101

A. The Suprenie Court Erred in Ruling that AT&T1

Pension Benefits Calculation Wis Facially Neutraland
Exiempt from Liability

I nder

the Bona tide Seniority

System Exception
The Supreme Court wrongly held that AT&T's pension
benefits policy was exempt froni liability under the
bona fide seniority system exception. The policy
violated Title VII because AT&T's benefits calculation
was intentionally discriminatory according to the plain
text and Congressional intent of the PDA. as well as
judicial precedent. 102
1. AT&fTi Pension Benefits Policy Is Intentionally
Discriminatory According to the Plain Reading of
the PregnancyDiscrinination Act, and Thus Violates
Title VlI

The Court incorrectly held thatAT&T's pension benefits
calculation was facially neutral. AT&T's pension
benefit calculation is intentionally discriminatory
according to the plain text of the PDA.10 Because
the effect of the pension calculation was to reduce
benefits based on sex, the plain text of the policy was
intentionally discriminatory. 104 T'he PDA requires that
the respondents be treated the same as other employees
in their pension benefits, regardless of whether
pregnancy -related disability leave was applied before
the PDA. 10o The act of calculating the respondents'
pension benefits is "based on" or "because of" sex
because AT&T deliberately chose to use the credit
application of the pregnancy-related disability leave
from prior to the enactment of the PDA to calculate the
complaining parties' pension benefits.1 06
AT&T's pension benefits calculation was intentionally
discriminatory because it violated the core principles
of the PDA that require that employers treat "women
affected by pregnancy" the same for all employmentrelated purposes. 107 The complaining parties were
pregnant women affected by AT&T's pension benefits
calculation because they were treated differently than
other similarly situated employees who did not take
pregnancy-related disability leavels AlT&I's pension
benefits calculation awvarded lessei peiision benefits to
rhe individuals wxho nook prcgnancy-relatcd disability
leaxve before the PDA xvas enacted than it awvarded
to other similarly situated employees that took nonpregnancy-related disability leaxve. 109 Therefore, the
Court icorrectly held that AT&T's pension benefits
calculation was facially neutral because Pie calculation
xxas intentioiially discriniinatory according to the plaiin
text of the PDA.110

2 AT&T i Pension Benefits Policy Is ttentionally
Discriminatoiy According to the Congressional
hItent of the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct, and hus
Violates Title VIL
Additionally, the Court incorrectly held that AT&T's
pension benefits calculation was facially neutral
because the calculation is intentionally discriminatory
according to the congressional intent of the PDA."
Congress intended for the PDA to prohibit companies
from reducing employees' pension benefits because of
pregnancy.I I

Congress enacted the PDA to reestablish the principle
of TFitle VII as it had been understood prior to the
Gilbert decision." 13Gilbert upheld principles contrary
to the EEOC interpretation guidelines on Iitle
VII, which protected pregnant vvomen from unjust
employment discrimination.1I4 The legislative history
of the PDA endorsed EEOC's 1972 guidelines, that
prohibited AT&T from reducing employees' pension
benefits based on pregnancy.15 The EEOC guidelines
require an employer to calculate pension benefits and
disability credit on the same terms for all employees.116
The PDA clarified that discrimination based on
pregnancy and childbirth was sex discrimination
and prohibited under Title VII.'' After the PDA,
employment practices such as General Electric's
disability program, at issue in Gilbert. and AT&T's
pension benefits calculation are considered sex
discrimination under Title VII." iTherefore, the
Supreme Court incorrectly held that AT&T's pension
benefits calculation was facially neutral because
Congress intended for the PDA to require that pension
benefits calculations provide the same benefits to all
employees vhether pregnant or not.119
3.AT&T PensionBenefits CalculationIs Intentionally
DiscriminatoryAccording to the Bazeniore Rule and
Ledbetter Requirements, And Therefore Violates Title

Vi
Under Bazemore's similarly situated rule, the Court
incorrectly held that AT&T's pension benefits
calculation vvas facially neutral. Similar to the
seniority system in Bazeniore, where Black employees
wveie paid less than Wh ite employees for the same
positioii Al & I granted full pension benefits for
retiring employees vvho took non-pregnancy related
disability leave and only giaiited partial credit to
20
employees vvho took pregnancy-related leave.i
AT&T's intent to discriminate vvas fuither ev inced
vwhen it agreed to awsard full1 ciredit to one female
employee that took pregnancy-related disability leave
before the PDA, without changing the net credited
Following
syst em for all affected employees."

Bazemore, courts have held, as in Pallas and Hulteen,
that seniority systems awarding pensions disparately
I S
based on pregnancy are Title VII violations.122 Al T&
pension benefits calculation is similar to the system
in Pallas.lflIn Pa/las, Pacific Bells new retirement
program disqualified female employees because of
pregnancy leave. Likewise, AT&T made no adjustments
to PT&T's net credit system causing employees that
took pregnancy-related disability leave before the
enactment of the PDA to suffer smaller pensions.124
The previous analysis demonstrating that AT&T's
employment practice violated the Bazemnore rule also
demonstrates that the practice violates the Ledbetter
standard for disparate-impact claris.125 Ihe Court
wrongly held that Al&'s pension benefits calculation
was facially neutral because AT&T's pension benefits
calculation is intentionally discriminatory according
to Bazemore 's similarly situated rule and Ledbetter 's
disparate-impact claim requirements.126
4. AT& TI Pension Benefits Calculation Does Not
Qualif for the Bona Fide Seniorit Systen Exception
in teamster and Section 703(h) , and Ihus Violates Title
VIL
The Court erred in applying Teaiiistcrs and the
Section 703(h) exeiription to
l&'Is pension
benefits calculation.127 Unlike the seniority system
in Teamsters that applied to all races equally, AI&I's
seniority system did not apply to all employees
equally.128 Here, the complaining parties had sufficient
evidence that the differential treatment resulting from
AT&T's pension benefits calculation was rooted in
discriminatory intent.l '9The Supreme Court erred in
applying Teamsters and the Section 703(h) exemption,
and therefore AT&T violated Title VII.130
B. Ihe Court Erred in Holding tiat the PDA k1buld
Have to Be Retroactive or It To ,pply to AtTS
Pension Beniefits Calculatiotin

The PDA would not require a retroactive effect for it
to apply to the Al & T case for tvo reasons.1i First,
the IEvans piesent v iolation rule does not apply to this
case. Second, AT&T's pension benefits calculation is a
piresent violation according to the Civ il Rights AVct of
1991 and the ILilly Ledbheter Fair Fax AVct.
1. Evans' Pr'esemit Vio/ation Ru/e Does Not App/v to
ATIeJ Peiisioii Bemits ('a/cu/lationi Bec ause the
Ca/culiation Is a Present tte VII Vio/ation
AT&T's discriminatory act is different from the
United Airlines' seniority system in Evans.132 Unlike
Evans, AlT& T's discriminatory act vvas a newv lithe VII
violation because it distinguished between similarly
situated employees.ir Evans' present violation

rule does not apply to this case because the AlT&TI
employees were affected by both a decision to apply
only thirty days of credit for their pregnancy-related
disability leave, and the calculations of their pension
benefits.134
This case is not a present violation because
AlT&TI 's policy was not a violation continuing from
prior to the enactment of the PDA. Each pension
benefits calculation for each aggrieved party was a
discriminatory compensation decision and a separate
Title VII violation. 1 Therefore, the PDA would not
have to be applied retroactively for AT&T's pension
benefits calculation to constitute a present Title VII
violation.136
2. AT& TI Pension Benefits Calculation Is a Present
iolation According to the Civil Rights Act of 1991
and the Lilly Ledbetter Pair Pay Act Because the
Emnplovees Utre Harnied When They Received Snialler
Pension Bene fits Based on PregnancyDiscrinination.

According to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the PDA -would not have to be
applied retroactively for a Title VII violation because
employees were harmed by the deprivation of benefits
when they received smaller pension benefits based on
pregnancy discrimination.'3 Both statutes allowed
the complaining party to file a claim with the EEOC
within 180 days of AT&T awarding reduced benefits
based on pregnancy. m t

EEOC is charged with administering Iitle VII.14
Section 713(a) of ITitle VlI grants the EEOC the power
to issue regulations on Title VII.146 Furthermore,
Congress gave the EEOC authority to issue regulations
defining unlaswful employment practices under Title
VII. Therefore, the Court should have given deference
to any reasonable interpretation of the Title VII by the
EEOC.147
The Court should have given the EEOC guidelines
"great deference" in determining a Title ViI violation
as it did in Griggs, because the EEOC's endorsement
of the Pallas decision supports the principles of the
Civil Rights Act and contains valid reasoning.148 The
factual similarities between Hulteen and Pallas make
the EEOC's endorsement wsell-reasoned. 49
The EEOC's endorsement of the Pallas decision
supports the principles of the Civil Rights Act because
it required that women that are affected by pregnancy
are treated the same as their colleagues vho are not
or cannot become pregnant.150 Furthermore, the
Pa/las decision followed the principles of the PDA in
clarifying that discrimination based on pregnancy and
childbirth was sex discrimination and prohibited under
Title VII.11 Therefore, the Supreme Court should have
given the EEOC great deference.152
I.LCoicyRecommendation
A. Congress Should Decrease Employees' Brdena
of Proof of Intent to Discriminate in Fringe Bene fit

Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the employees were harmed
because they received reduced benefits.139 Therefore,
the respondents had the right under Title VII to file
a charge with the EEOC each time they received
a pension benefit based on pregnancy status.140 1
conclusion, the Supreme Court erred in holding
that the PDA would have to be retroactive for the
respondents to recover.141
C. The Court Should Have Given Deference to

DiscrininationCases
The Court's decision in AT& Tv I/iHlteen is a setback
in the fight for women's equality and will result in
smaller pension and retirement benefits for vsomen.1 53
Congress must respond to the Court's decision, as it did
in Gilbert,to protect these women from discriminatory
employment practices. 154 Congress should amend
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act by decreasing the
burden on employees to prove an employer's intent to
discriminate.15

the Equal Emnploynient Opportunity Coninission&

Endorsenientof the Pallas IDecision
The EEOC 's endorsement ot the Pa//as decision was
entitled tn deterenece by the Courmmt.142 If the Court
had hceded the EEOC interpretation, it would hasve
held that AT& T mtist alloys women vsho wsere on
pregnancy-related disability lease to accrtie seniority
in the sanme vsay as those vwho weare on leave for raasons
unrelated to pregnancy.143' The EEOC deserved "great
deference" in this case, similar to the laevel of deference
in Phillips arid (Griggs.1i44

Whilc the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act madc it casier
for emnployees to vwin Title VII disparate-inmpact claims,
emnployees still havea a hefty burden of proof.15m6 It is
very difficult for an employee to prose the enmployer's
intent to disciminate, especially vshlen the practice
originated years ago.)6 Congress should include
clarifying language that an employee can prove a
"discriminatory compensation dlecision" by shosving
that she is a member of the protected class and was
treated differently than a similarly situated person.i'

The Court holding in AT& T v. Hulteen was erroneous because AT&T's
pension benefits calculation was intentionally discriminatory, a present Title
VII violation, and failed to give the EEOC deference.i5 Al&Is pension
benefits calculation should not have been allowed to prevail as a bona fide
seniority system.160 This decision penalizes wornen for taking pregnancyrelated disability leave in their earlier careers, and creates another obstacle
in work place equality. 1i
Congress should respond to this decision by amending the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act to decrease the burden on employees proving employer's intent
to discriminate in fringe benefit discrimination.162 Congress' response will
prevent unfair treatment of retirement mothers. 63
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